2. On G. E. Moore

G. E. Moore’s Principia Ethica, published in 1903, has an important place in twentieth century ethical thought. Any discussion of twentieth century ethics normally begins with Moore.

I have studied and taught G. E. Moore for several years. What I like most in the whole book is the preface, because it deals with the logic of ethics or, as Moore puts it, with “the fundamental principles of ethical reasoning”.[1]

Moore has distinguished between two kinds of questions, which, according to him, moral philosophers have “always professed to answer”, and which, he maintains, “they have almost always confused” with one another and with other questions. The first question is: “What kind of things ought to exist for their own sakes?” And the second question is, “What kind of actions ought we to perform?”[2]

The distinction made by Moore between ends and means is worth making. In fact, the distinction has been made by earlier moral philosophers too, like Mill, for example.[3] However, I think, the formulation of the first question is a little misleading. When we ask, “What kind of things ought to exist for their own sakes?” (emphasis mine), it seems to suggest that the things are valuable in themselves without any reference to human beings, human needs and human desires. Ethics is a human creation and a social need. Ethical ends are human ends. Therefore, ethical ends cannot be independent of basic human needs and desires. For being ethical ends, things have to exist not for their own sakes but for human sakes. The question ought to be reformulated, according to me, as follows: What kind of things human beings desire for their own sakes? And, to my mind, the obvious answer to this question is: life and happiness.

Next, Moore has discussed “the nature of evidence, by which alone any ethical proposition can be proved or disproved, confirmed or rendered  doubtful”.[4]

According to Moore, “for answers to the first question, no relevant evidence whatever can be adduced; from no other truth, except themselves alone, can it be inferred that they are either true or false. We can guard against error only by taking care, that, when we try to answer a question of this kind, we have before our minds that question only, and not some other or others.”[5]

As for the second question, according to Moore, “the kind of evidence, which is both necessary and alone relevant to such proof and disproof, is capable of exact definition. Such evidence must contain propositions of two kinds and of two kinds only: it must consist in the first place, of truths with regard to the result of the action in question – of causal truths – but it must also contain ethical truths of our first or self-evident class.”[6]

Moore’s answer to the second question shows that Moore is in ethics a teleologist like utilitarians, and not an anti-teleologist or deontologist like Kant. In other words, he believes that the rightness or wrongness of an action depends on its consequences; if the consequences are good, the action is “right” and if the consequences are bad, the action is “wrong”. On this issue, I will go along with Moore, because I am also a teleologist.

However, regarding the answer of the first question, I agree that the answer will have to be “self-evident” in the sense that they will have to be like axioms of mathematics, to be accepted without any formal proof. However, they cannot be “self-evident” in totally subjective sense. I do not think we can arrive at sound ethical axioms just by keeping the two ethical questions of Moore separate from one another, because in that case the answer will become very subjective. For example, according to Moore, "the pleasures of human intercourse and enjoyment of beautiful objects" are good in themselves. This way, everyone can come up with his own answers, and what is “self-evident” to one may not be “self-evident” to another. It is far safer to base ethical ends on common and basic needs of all or almost all human beings. If we reformulate the first question, as suggested by me, the answer is not subjective and arbitrary. All or almost all human beings desire life and happiness.

Actually, we need some meta-ethical considerations for arriving at sound ethical axioms. By “meta-ethical considerations”, I mean considerations about ethics: the origin, role, function and need of ethics: the kind of considerations, which I have presented in the chapters on Russell and Mill, and to some extent in this chapter.

Besides, the way Moore talks about the ethical “truths” of the “first” kind shows that he is a cognitivist in ethics, whereas I have already supported non-cognitivism in the chapter on Russell.

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