1. The Ethical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell
Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore, who studied together at Cambridge, are two important British thinkers of 20th Century. They carried on an intellectual battle against Hegelian idealism and initiated the analytical and realistic trend in Philosophy, which later became the dominant trend not only in England but also in America.
It is generally acknowledged that Moore's Principia Ethica (1903) has influenced ethical philosophy of twentieth century in important ways. Russell's ethical ideas, on the other hand, have not earned sufficient academic recognition. In fact, some of Russell's writings do deal with fundamental ethical problems.
First, to begin with, Russell was in his adolescence, before going to Cambridge, a utilitarian. It appeared so self-evident to him that "happiness of mankind should be the aim of all actions" that he believed that it must be the universal view. Therefore, he was surprised to find that this was only one among a number of ethical theories and was called "utilitarianism". He declared himself a utilitarian after this discovery. In this stage of thinking, he treated "greatest happiness of greatest number" as his ideal and, then, applied reason to find out the course most conducive to this end.[1]
However, the first mature exposition of Russell's ethical views is to be found in "The Elements of Ethics", an essay contained in his book Philosophical Essays (1910). In "The Elements" Russell expounds an ethics largely based on G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica. At the time of writing "The Elements" Russell was, like Moore, a cognitivist in ethics. He believed that (1)"good" is the most fundamental ethical concept and (2) that "good" is indefinable. He further maintained that we know a priori certain propositions about the kind of things that are good on their own account. In addition, that when we make a statement such as "X is good", we make a statement like "this table is round", which is either true or false, and whose truth or falsity is independent of our opinions and emotions.[2]
Nonetheless, the cognitivist phase of Russell's thinking did not last long. Soon he started moving from ethical cognitivism to ethical non-cognitivism. The change was mainly brought about by Santayana's criticism of Russell's "The Element" in his book Winds of Doctrine (1913). The main thrust of Santayana's criticism was that "good" cannot be totally independent of human interests and feelings; and that propositions about intrinsic goodness -- if they can be called propositions at all -- cannot be true or false in a manner in which propositions in physical sciences are., because they are not statements about certain objective state of affairs but are only expressions of "preferences we feel".[3]
An exposition of Russell's ethical non-cognitivism in its developed form is found in Religion and Science (1935), which was published one year before A. J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic in which Ayer has expounded the emotive theory of ethics. In Religion and Science Russell regards, as he does in "The Elements", defining "good" as the fundamental problem of ethics. According to him, once "good" is defined, the rest of ethics follows: we ought to act in the way we believe most likely to create as much good as possible, and as little of its correlative evil. In other words, once we define "good", framing of moral rules is a matter for science.
However, points out Russell, when we try to be definite as to what we mean by "good", we land ourselves in great difficulties, because unlike in scientific questions, in a question as to whether this or that is the ultimate good, there is no evidence either way. The disputants can only appeal to their own emotions, and employ rhetorical devices to rouse similar emotions in others. According to Russell, when a man says "this is good in itself"; he seems to be making a statement like "this is square" or "this is sweet". Nevertheless, what the man really means is "I wish everybody to desire this" or "Would that everybody desire this".
The first of these sentences, which may be true or false, does not belong to says Russell, ethics but to psychology or biography. The second sentence which does belong to ethics, expresses a desire for something, but asserts nothing and since it asserts nothing it is logically impossible that there should be evidence for or against it, or for it to possess either truth or falsehood.
Thus, there are two aspects of Russell's ethical ideas as expressed in Religion and Science: (1) that ethical statements are not indicative or fact-stating though they seem to be so, and (2) they are optative or desire expressing.[4]
Russell's final ethical views are to be found in Human Society in Ethics and Politics (1954), which may be regarded as the most important ethical writing of Russell. In Human Society, Russell adopts as his guiding principle David Hume's maxim that "Reason is, and ought, only to be the slave of the passions". In effect what Russell says in Human Society, is not very different from what he says in Religion and Science; when an ethical disagreement is about means for achieving certain ends, it can be resolved by the use of reason; but when the disagreement is about ends reason is of no help, because what ends we pursue depends ultimately on our desires. As in Religion and Science, Russell is also at pains to emphasize that our desires are not "irrational" just because we cannot give any reason for them. According to Russell, a desire cannot, in itself, be either rational or irrational. We may desire A because it is a means to B, but in the end, when we have done with mere means we must come to something, which we desire for no reasons. Nevertheless, the desire cannot be called irrational merely because no reasons can be given for feeling it.
However, Russell's dissatisfaction with his own non-cognitivist theory of ethics, which earlier finds an expression in "Reply to Criticism" in The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell (1946) reappears in Human Society and we find him wondering once again whether there is such a thing as ethical knowledge. In an important passage he says: "It may be that there is some similar way of arriving at objectivity in ethics; if so, since it must involve appeal to the majority, it will take us from personal ethics into the sphere of politics, which is, in fact, very difficult to separate from ethics."
Russell sums up his efforts to arrive at an objective ethics in the following fundamental propositions and definitions:
1. Surveying the acts which arouse emotions of approval or disapproval, we find that, as a general rule, the acts which are approved of are those believed likely to have, on the balance, effects of certain kinds while opposite effects are expected from acts that are disapproved of.
2. Effects that lead to approval are defined as "good" and those leading to disapproval are as "bad".
3. An act of which, on the available evidence, the effects are likely to be better than those of any other act that is possible in the circumstances, is defined as "right"; any other act is "wrong". What we "ought" to do is, by definition, the act which is right.
4. It is right to feel approval of a right act and disapproval of a wrong act.
According to Russell, these definitions and propositions, if accepted, provide a coherent body of ethical propositions, which are true (or false) in the same sense as if they were propositions of science. He admits that different societies in different ages have given approval to a wide diversity of acts; but, argues Russell, the difference between us and other ages in these respects is attributable to a difference between our beliefs and theirs as to the effects of actions. Thus, Russell is led to the conclusion that there is more agreement among humankind as to the effects that we should aim than as to the kinds of acts that are approved. "I think", he says, "the contention of Henry Sidgwick, that acts which are approved of are those that are likely to bring happiness or pleasure, is, broadly speaking, true".
If, points out Russell, it is admitted that the great majority of approved acts are such as are believed to have certain effects, and it is found, further, that exceptional acts, which are approved without having this character, tend to be no longer approved when their exceptional character is realized; then it becomes possible, in a certain sense, to speak of ethical error. We may say, according to Russell, that it is "wrong" to approve of such exceptional acts, meaning that such approval does not have the effects which mark the great majority of approved acts.
Although on the above theory, ethics contains statements, which are true or false, and not merely optative or imperative, Russell admits, "its basis is still one of emotion and feeling". The emotion of approval is involved in the definition of "right" and "wrong" and the feeling of enjoyment or satisfaction is involved in the definition of "good" or "intrinsic value". Thus, according to Russell, "the appeal upon which we depend for the acceptance of our ethical theory is not the appeal to the facts of perception, but to emotions and feelings which have given rise to the concepts of 'right' and 'wrong', 'good' and 'bad''." [5]
Thus, the main shift in Russell's ethical thinking is from cognitivism to non-cognitivism. Russell shares his non-cognitivism with ethical thinkers like A. J. Ayer, C. L. Stevenson, R. M Hare and P. H. Nowell-Smith. C. L. Stevenson has largely followed Ayer's emotive analysis of ethical terms. R. M. Hare, on the other hand, has given a prescriptive analysis of ethical terms and statements. Nowell-Smith, too, is a prescriptivist. Russell's ethical ideas are different from A. J.Ayer and R. M. Hare in the sense that in case of Russell the emphasis is mainly on desires. He repeatedly links "good" with desires. Therefore, his analysis of ethical terms is more appropriately described as optative.
Secondly, Russell shows a greater awareness of the social importance or social function of ethical concepts. For example, he clearly says in An Outline of Philosophy that "good" is mainly a social concept designed to find from conflict of desires - between desires of different persons and incompatible desires of the same person. He also adds that though primarily we call something "good" when we desire it, but, since the use of words is social, gradually "good" comes to apply to things desired by the whole social group.[6]
It was this awareness of the social function of ethical concepts, which led Russell to make one last attempt to arrive at an objective ethics in Human Society. In the process he gives some important hints which are worth exploring if one is to arrive at an objective ethics, that is to say, as objective as the subject matter would allow.
In conclusion, I want to make some critical comments on Russell's ethical ideas. As far as I am concerned, I came to philosophy in search of a rational morality, at least as rational as possible. I believed, and still believe, that scientific method is the best method for resolving factual disagreements and arriving at conclusions regarding what is the case. However, I could not accept that the denotation of the term rational was the same as the denotation of the term scientific. I believed that there could be a method, not scientific in the empirical sense, yet rational, for resolving ethical disagreements or disagreements regarding what ought to be. The fact that the scientific method could not solve the fundamental problems of values, so I thought, in no way reduced the importance of such problems. They remain as fundamental and important as ever. On the other hand, the fact that the scientific method alone could not give an answer to the fundamental questions of ethics did not reduce in any way the importance of scientific method in the sphere of facts. I had hoped that studying philosophy could help me in finding a rational method for resolving ethical disagreements or, in other words, in arriving at a rational morality. When I undertook a systematic study of Russell's ethical ideas and their development, I had hoped that this research would throw new light on the ethical problems, which had stimulated my original interest in philosophy. I must admit that I was not wrong in thinking so.
The main shift in Russell's ethical thinking in his long philosophical career is from cognitivism to non-cognitivism. Therefore, the main question we need to ask in evaluating Russell's thinking is whether Russell was justified in making this transition. It appears to me that, as far as Russell's non-cognitivism is concerned, his arguments are incontrovertible. He is right in maintaining that in ethical disagreements of fundamental nature we cannot give arguments or evidence of the kind we can in scientific and factual disagreements. In addition, that this is so that because ethical statements are not indicative, though they have been confused as such by a long line of ethical philosophers. A statement like, "We ought to pursue happiness as an end" or "Happiness is good in itself" is not a factual one, because it does not assert what is the case but recommends what ought to be the case.
We call a factual statement true if there is a corresponding fact. However, since ethical statements do not state facts, there is no question of there being a corresponding fact or the statement being true or false in the sense in which factual statements are.
Therefore, we can say that Russell's transition from cognitivism to non-cognitivism was not only justified but it was an important step in ethical philosophy, because it changed the perspective of subsequent ethical thinking. Once we grant that Russell was justified in this transition from cognitivism to non-cognitivism, we also have to admit that by doing so he demonstrated that the attempts made by different cognitivist philosophers were misdirected to some extent, and that if we are to solve the problems of ethics at all we have to make attempts in somewhat different direction.
Ethics, it is true, owing to the very nature of its problems cannot be objective in the sense in which physical sciences are. This, however, does not mean that reason has no role to play in ethical matters. As far as means are concerned, reason certainly plays a role. Moreover, even the ends need not be totally arbitrary. Both ends and means have to be compatible with the reality. Besides, we could derive the ends from the common desires of all or a majority of human beings as Russell tries to do in Human Society in Ethics and Politics. In this way, we could arrive at an objective ethics, not objective in the sense of being independent of human desires, but objective in the sense of being independent of desires of a particular individual at a particular time. Though ethics cannot be independent of human desires - in fact, the demand for ethics totally independent of human desires is irrational in the sense that it is based on inadequate understanding of the nature of ethics - it certainly can be independent of desires of a particular individual at a particular time. Russell tried to give objectivity to ethics by basing it on the common desires of all or the majority of human beings. He was needlessly apologetic about his formulations because he had the ideal of physical sciences in his mind. Ethical ends are, after all, human ends, and there would be no ethics in a world devoid of human beings. The fact that the scientific method alone is not capable of solving the fundamental problems of ethics in no way undermines the importance either of the scientific method or of the problems of ethics. We have only to realize that the logic of ethical discourse is different from the logic of scientific discourse, and we have to investigate what that logic is. It appears to me that in case of fundamental ethical statements like "Happiness is good" the criterion of correspondence with facts has to be replaced by "in accordance with fundamental human desires". We may say that if the statement "Happiness is good" is in accordance with fundamental human desires, it is an "ethically sound" statement to make, even if it cannot be called "true" in the factual sense. In fact, I think it is an ethically sound statement keeping in mind the nature and function of ethical ideas as well as the fundamentals of human nature and the factual reality. To put it simply, life and happiness (satisfaction of desires) are good because all or almost all human beings desire it. Treating this as an axiom - and this is not an arbitrary one - we can derive the rest of ethics by applying reason and scientific method. In this way, we can develop a rational, secular and human ethics.
[1]Russell, Autobiography, p.39.
[2] Russell, Philosophical Essays, pp. 15-17.
[3] Santayana, Winds of Doctrine, p.140-44.
[4] Russell, Religion and Science, pp. 228-42.
[5] Russell, Human Society in Ethics and Politics, pp. 110-18.
[6] Russell, An Outline of Philosophy, pp. 181-87.