8. Some False Dichotomies
Philosophy has been, I think, plagued by some false dichotomies. The most famous of them is the one between “mind” and “matter”. It was formulated first by Plato in ancient period and then by Descartes in modern period.
As formulated by Descartes, “matter” and “mind” are two different things; “matter” has “extension” but no “consciousness”, and “mind” on the other hand has “consciousness” but no “extension”.
This view of Descartes has puzzled me ever since I became acquainted with it as an undergraduate student. To me it appeared that the human mind exists inside the human skull. So, we are being told that mind has “consciousness” but no “extension”! Did Descartes expect to find empty space inside our skulls, I wondered!
Actually, what we have inside our skulls is brain, which is as much material or physical as other parts of our body. All the activities, which are normally associated with “mind”, in fact, take place inside our brains. Thus, this whole dichotomy of “mind” and “matter” is a false dichotomy. No wonder Gilbert Ryle characterized Descartes’ view as “ghost inside the machine”.
I think this “mind” and “matter” dualism has led to a further mischief. First, it was assumed that “mind” is something totally different from “matter”, and then, the metaphysical idealists went a step further and started claiming that the ultimate reality was “mental” or “spiritual”. When “mind” simply cannot exist apart from matter, then how can the ultimate reality be “mental”? This is nothing but a big confusion!
“Physical pleasures” and “mental pleasures”
A similar distinction is made in ethics between “physical pleasures” and “mental pleasures”. In a way, it is linked to the “mind” and “body” dichotomy, because “mental pleasures” are treated as being radically different from “physical pleasures”. For example, this distinction has been made in the context of hedonism, with Aristippus favoring “physical pleasures” and Epicurus favoring “mental pleasures”. Pleasures derived from food, drinks and sex will normally be considered “physical pleasures”, whereas pleasures derived from reading or writing a book, contemplating and solving an intellectual problem will normally be considered “mental pleasures”.
This distinction, again, I think, is logically unsustainable. First, because “mental”, too, is “physical”. Secondly, even if we reformulate the distinction between “physical” and “mental” by saying that “physical” is associated with the body excluding the brain, and “mental” with brain excluding the body, still we cannot experience the so called “mental” pleasures without using our body excluding the brain and vice versa. Can we, for example, normally read a book without using our hands and eyes? Alternatively, can we experience the pleasure of food and drinks without our brain functioning in a proper manner?
There is another way of showing that the distinction between “physical” and “mental” pleasures is not satisfactory. Even if we accept this distinction in a general way, without going deep into the issue, there are some borderline cases, which we will find difficult to categorize either way. Consider this, the pleasure derived from appreciating “natural beauty”, clouds, mountains, rivers, stars, etc., how is this to be categorized? The supporters of the distinction will most probably call it “mental pleasure”. Then, the pleasure derived from viewing a nude human body, male or female, as the case might be, how is this going to be categorized? As “physical pleasure” perhaps, but why? What is the difference? Moreover, are not human beings parts of nature? In fact, anything related to sex is tended to be categorized as “physical”.
Consider another incongruity, appreciating “natural beauty” or listening to music will normally be considered “mental pleasure”, whereas pleasure derived from food and drink as well as sex is normally considered “physical”, but what is the difference? Do we need to exercise our mental faculties as much for appreciating natural beauty or music, as we need to for reading and writing a book, or for contemplating and solving an intellectual problem. If we primarily use our eyes and ear, then the pleasure is “mental” and if we use our sense of taste and touch, the pleasure is “physical”! Are our eyes and ears not parts of our body as our tongue is?
In fact, even if we accept the distinction between “physical” and “mental” pleasures in a rough manner, I find the whole business of deciding which pleasure is “superior”, “physical” or “mental” a little odd. Suppose we say, as Aristippus is said to have done, that “physical pleasures” are “superior” to “mental pleasures”. Then, what? Should we spend our entire lives only eating, drinking and having sex? Never read or write a book, never contemplate an intellectual problem, never appreciate “natural beauty” or music, never think about larger social or political issues?
Alternatively, say we conclude like Epicurus and Mill that “mental pleasures” are “superior” to “physical pleasures”. Then, what does it mean? Should we spend our entire lives only reading and writing books and in other similar “mental” activities? Never enjoy good food and drinks; never have sex? This is simply ridiculous! No matter how intellectualized a person is he or she has to satisfy his or her “physical needs”. Any good life will have its share of both “physical” and “mental” pleasures, the mix may vary from person to person or from time to time in same person’s life. If anything, in most cases the balance is more likely to be tilted in the direction of “physical” because human beings cannot survive without fulfilling their basic “physical” needs.
Take this example, in case of the pleasure derived from intoxicating drinks; it is very easy for moralists to take a stand and say this is a “physical pleasure” and, therefore, it is “inferior” and it should be discarded, but what about drinking water? Suppose I am thirsty, I drink a glass of plain water and derive pleasure or satisfaction. What will it be called, “physical” or “mental”? Obviously, “physical”, then? Shall we avoid drinking water because it is “inferior” kind of pleasure!
Actually, there is a tendency among some moralists to downgrade and look down upon those of human needs, which we share with other “lower animals”, thirst, hunger, sleep and sex, for instance. Nevertheless, in fact, there is no need to be ashamed of our so-called “lower” self. Let us not forget that human beings are rational animals. Because of their developed brains, human beings have some needs, which other animals do not have. It is this rationality, which distinguishes humans from other animals. However, human rationality does not exist in a vacuum; it exists in an animal body.
We have also to keep in mind that ethical rules are made for human beings and not vice versa. Any rational ethics has to be formulated keeping in mind the human nature and the basic human needs. Any ethics, which tends to downgrade and look down upon basic human needs like thirst, hunger, sleep and sex; is not to be taken seriously. Suppose some moralist frame an ethical rule, “Thou shall not drink water when thirsty”, who is going to follow it? Some religions have framed the moral rule for their priest class, “Thou shall not have sex”, and we all know how much it is being followed. (To say that we should control our sexual desires and not have sex with any one without his or her consent is one thing, but to totally prohibit sex is quite another.)
To conclude, any good life, I repeat, will have its share of both “physical” and “mental” pleasures.
“Egoism” and “Altruism”
Egoism versus altruism is, I think, another false dichotomy. This, again, figures in the context of hedonism, with Aristippus and Epicurus supporting “egoistic” hedonism on one hand; and Bentham and Mill supporting “altruistic” hedonism on the other.[1] According to egoistic hedonism, one should act in such a manner as to maximize one’s own happiness, whereas according to altruistic hedonism or utilitarianism, one should act in such a manner as to maximize general happiness or, at least, maximum happiness of maximum number.[2]
If “egoistic” hedonism is interpreted to mean that one should do whatever one thinks will give maximum pleasure to one self, without bothering about its effects on others, then certainly it is not an acceptable theory of ethics.
One may make here a distinction, as has been made by Mill, between actions, which “concerns others”, and actions, which merely concern the person performing the action;[3] in other words, actions whose effects are confined to oneself and actions, which have effects on others. In case of self-regarding actions, one may claim that one can do whatever pleases oneself. However, in case of other-regarding actions one has to draw a line. One cannot say that I will kill a person because it gives me pleasure. What about the other person’s right to life? Similarly, one cannot say that I will rape a person because it gives me pleasure, because it violates the other person’s sexual freedom. (To be fair to Aristippus and Epicurus, I very much doubt they would have approved of such acts.)
The flaws of “egoistic” hedonism thus interpreted are obvious, but I want to draw attention to the inadequacy of “altruistic” hedonism to solve all our ethical problems. This is not realized as often. If one interprets “altruistic” hedonism to mean that one should always act in such a manner as to increase general happiness or the maximum happiness of the maximum number, then it leads to some insoluble ethical problems. Suppose, again to take a basic example, I am thirsty and I want to drink water. Is it the right thing to do or not? I would say, under normal circumstances, it is. But am I supposed to ask myself before drinking water, “Is my drinking water going to maximize happiness for all?” My drinking water when I am thirsty is not going to maximize happiness for all or even for the maximum number still it is the right thing to do. Any ethical theory, which says it is wrong or not right to drink water when thirsty, is very unrealistic. Same applies to having food when hungry, sleeping when sleepy and having sex when one has the urge, the only thing one has to be careful is not to transgress on the freedom of others. I think Mill’s formula as given in his On Liberty is commendable: one should have maximum freedom to live one’s own life as one wants unless one transgresses on similar freedom of others.
The point I want to make is that if “egoistic” hedonism as interpreted above is inadequate, so is “altruistic” hedonism as interpreted above. If “egoistic” hedonism lacks social dimension, then “altruistic” hedonism lacks personal dimension. As in case of “physical” and “mental” pleasures, no matter how intellectualized one may be one has to satisfy one’s “physical” needs, because one cannot survive without that; similarly, no matter how “altruistic” a person is one must satisfy one’s “egoistic” needs as well. In fact, most of one’s actions in day-to-day life are going to be “egoistic”. One may postpone sex to a relatively larger extent; one may even postpone thirst, hunger and sleep to some extent. In fact, one may need to postpone these at times in a rational and happy life. Nevertheless, in the ultimate analysis one cannot survive without drinking water, eating food and having adequate sleep. I have said earlier that a good life must have its share of both “physical” and “mental” pleasures, though the mix may vary from person to person and time to time in same person’s life. Similarly, a good life will be both “egoistic” and “altruistic”, the mix, again, may vary from person to person and from time to time in same person’s life.
To get a satisfactory theory of ethics, I think, we need to introduce two important distinctions – one between act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism; and another between social ethics and personal ethics. This will enable us to overcome the dichotomy between “egoistic” and “altruistic”.
The distinction between rule and act utilitarianism has been made, for example, by J. J. C. Smart in his article on utilitarianism in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy.[4] In act utilitarianism we ask whether a particular action by a particular individual is going to increase general happiness; in rule utilitarianism, on the other hand, we ask whether following a particular moral rule is going to increase general happiness or not . “Altruistic” hedonism or utilitarianism, to my mind, can be satisfactory only as rule utilitarianism and not as act utilitarianism. If utilitarianism is interpreted as act utilitarianism to mean that every individual must ask before every act whether the act is going to maximize the happiness of all, then it is totally impractical and unrealistic. Most of the basic actions of all individuals are bound to be “egoistic”.
I want to introduce another distinction between social ethics and personal ethics. Social ethics, I will say, has to do with moral rules which everyone in society must follow, for example, don’t kill other human beings, don’t rape, as a general rule speak the truth, etc. Personal ethics, on the other hand, has to do with how one is to live one’s life within the framework of social ethics.
Everyone’s life and happiness is valuable or good and, therefore, every one must have maximum freedom to live one’s life in one’s own way unless one transgresses on similar freedom of others. This can be a sound basis for social ethics. Nevertheless, a person may still ask: how am I to live my life within the framework of social ethics? This is a question of personal ethics. Here a person will find more guidance in “egoistic” hedonism of Epicurus, for example, than in the “altruistic” hedonism of Bentham and Mill. So, if we put things in a proper perspective, both “egoistic” and “altruistic” hedonism have a place in a satisfactory theory of ethics. “Altruistic” hedonism or utilitarianism for moral rules to be followed by all, or in other words, for social ethics; and “egoistic” hedonism for individual actions within the framework of social ethics, or in other words, for personal ethics. Thus, just as there is no need for moralists to look down upon “physical” pleasures, similarly, there is no need to look down upon “egoistic” needs and desires. The best way to increase human happiness is for every one to work for his or her happiness within the framework of social ethics.
There is another way in which the false dichotomy of egoism and altruism raises its head. It has been remarked famously, again in the context of hedonism, by Martineau that “from ‘each for himself’ to ‘each for all’ -- no road”.[5] The problem arises because Bentham and Mill have invoked “psychological hedonism” to support their utilitarianism and psychological hedonism has been interpreted to mean that everyone desires his own happiness. Without entering into polemics, I want to place my conclusions here. I think we need to reformulate psychological hedonism a little. We do not directly desire happiness most of the times, but several other things, water when thirsty, food when hungry and so on. Satisfaction, pleasure or happiness is a mental state, which follows satisfaction of desires. The same thing may give happiness to one person and unhappiness to another, depending on whether, in the first place, one has a desire for it or not. If a person likes to see action movies and desires to see a particular action movie, he or she may derive pleasure by viewing it. But suppose I do not like seeing action movies and I am forced on gunpoint to watch one, will I derive any happiness out of it?
Psychological hedonism may be reformulated as “Every one desires satisfaction of desires, and happiness or pleasure or being satisfied is the mental state, which follows the satisfaction of desires.” We have to note that the desire to live is the most fundamental of human desires, and we also need to add that not all desires of any individual are strictly for his “own” self in the narrow sense of the term. Even the most “egoistic” person, who may not think about the entire humanity or about his country or about larger social and political issues, does normally think about his family, spouse and children. Parents often give priority to their child’s hunger over their own. In short, human beings do have the capacity to think and feel for others. In some, this capacity is more developed and in some, it is less. To use Butler’s terminology, human beings have both self-love and benevolence. Besides, human beings have rationality. This rationality and the capacity to feel for others are sufficient to provide a sound basis for social ethics. If moral rules are framed in such a manner that they give equal value to every human being and maximize their freedom to live their lives in their own way, then most human beings will willingly follow such rules in their enlightened self-interest.
Moral rules, to my mind, are like traffic rules. If every one, in his hurry to reach his destination, ignores traffic rules, then this will lead to a traffic jam with every one being stuck up. On the other hand, if the traffic rules are well formulated, and every one follows them, then every one will reach his destination smoothly. Similarly, if every one cares for his own happiness and ignores the effects of his actions on others, this will result in a moral “traffic jam”. Whereas if every one follows well-formulated ethical rules based on human needs and desires, then every one will be able to maximize her or his happiness. This is what I mean by saying that ethics is a social need. We need rational moral rules for harmonious social living. Besides, every human being needs a personal ethics to be clear about what he or she wants from life.
[1] P. B. Chatterji, for example, has presented these theories like this in his Principles of Ethics.
[2] Ibid, p.157. There is an oversimplification here, I think, of Bentham and Mill’s ideas, but still I have taken P.B. Chatterji’s exposition on face value to make a philosophical point. See, John Stuart Mill, Utilitariam, pp. 34-35.
[3] John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 135.
[4] Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 8, pp. 206-7.
[5] P.B. Chatterji, Op.Cit., p. 164.